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1 Introduction
There is a growing debate whether and how country-level regulations of doing business matter for
aggregate performance (Klapper et al, 2006; Djankov et al, 2006; Barseghyan, 2008; Branstetter
et al, 2014). In turn, empirical evidence suggests that one of the significant drivers behind re-
cent improvements in aggregate performance are investments in information and communication
technologies (ICT) (Jorgenson et al, 2005; Ketteni et al, 2007, 2011; Venturini, 2009).
In this paper, we investigate how country-level regulations of business activities affect industry-
level investments in ICT. In order to alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use a difference-in-differences
framework in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998). More specifically, we ask whether ex ante dif-
ferences in country-level regulations affect investments in ICT differently in industries that depend
more on these technologies compared to the industries that depend less. To establish our results,
we use industry- and country-level data from 14 OECD countries and the World Bank’s doing
business indicators. In particular, we focus on indicators related to starting business, registering
property, getting credit, protecting investors, and paying taxes.
Our results suggest that investments in ICT decline with the number of procedures, time, and
monetary costs required for starting a business, and procedures and time required for registering
property. Investments in ICT also decline with the number of tax payments and time required for
compiling tax payments. In turn, investments increase with the strength of legal rights. We fail to
establish any systematic evidence that the monetary costs required for registering property affect
investments in ICT. However, we find that they significantly reduce investments in information
technologies (IT) and software. Further, we fail to establish any systematic evidence that the
ability of shareholders to sue managers for misconduct and the extent of director liability for self-
dealing affect investments in ICT. We find, however, that increasing the ability of shareholders
to sue managers increases investments in software and increasing the extent of director liability
reduces investments in communication technologies (CT).
Many studies show that the regulations of business activities matter for economic growth (e.g.,
Djankov et al, 2006; Haidar, 2009; Barseghyan, 2008; Haidar, 2012). In particular, they find that
countries with less burdensome regulations grow faster. Given that investments in ICT contribute
significantly to economic growth (e.g., Jorgenson et al, 2005; Venturini, 2009), our findings suggest
a possible driver behind the results of such macro-level empirical studies.
Our findings can also be interesting for policymakers. They suggest possible policy instruments
which can increase investments in ICT and, therefore, aid and compliment policy agendas such
as the Digital Agenda in Europe. Moreover, the indicators of doing business regulations which we
employ are widely used in academia and by policymakers (Djankov, 2009). In both developing and
developed countries, policymakers often evaluate country-level regulatory environment and gains
from further (de-)regulations using these indicators. Our results provide explicit support for that.
Primarily, this paper is related to studies which identify the impact of regulations on investments
in ICT (e.g., Gruber and Verboven, 2001; Gust and Marquez, 2004; Heli and Kretschmer, 2005;
Andonova and Diaz-Serrano, 2009; Nardotto et al, 2012; Grajek and Ro¨ller, 2012). It is also related
to studies which analyze the impact of policies on investments and, particularly, on investments
in intangible assets (e.g., Carlin and Mayer, 2003; Claessens and Laeven, 2003). Typically, these
studies focus on particular industries and policies and find that less red-tape and deregulation
encourage investments. This paper contributes to these studies by assessing the impact country-
level regulations of doing business on industry-level investments in ICT. There is also a growing
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number of studies which investigate the impact of institutions and various regulations on economic
performance (e.g., Acemoglu et al, 2001; Bena et al, 2011; Amin and Haidar, 2012). This paper
contributes to these studies to the extent that one of the pronounced drivers of recent surge in
economic performance are the investments in ICT.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section offers a simple model to
motivate the empirical test. The third section offers the empirical specification, and describes the
data and its sources. The fourth section summarizes the results, and the last section concludes.
The tables of basic statistics and regression results are presented at the end of the paper.
2 Theoretical Model
A regulation, which is common to all industries, would penalize (or subsidize) investments in
information and communication technologies more in industries which depend more on these tech-
nologies.1 To show explicitly how such an inference can hold and set the stage for the empirical
analysis, we develop a stylized deterministic model which follows the model of Alesina et al (2005).
We consider an industry where N infinitely lived firms produce horizontally differentiated goods
x, indexed by j. For simplicity, let the production function of a good j (∀j = 1, ..., N) be
xj = Ak
α
j m
1−α
j , (1)
where A > 0 is an exogenous productivity level, k is the amount of ICT capital input,m summarizes
all other inputs, and α ∈ (0, 1) is output elasticity of ICT capital. In this respect, α measures the
dependence on that capital since higher α means higher output elasticity of ICT capital.
The firms can invest and accumulate capital with a technology
k˙ = ι− δk, (2)
where ι is the amount of investment, and the initial value of k is given and is the same for all
firms. We further assume that firms incur adjustment costs for installing the newly created capital.
Adjustment costs are in terms of the capital and have the standard quadratic form b2
(
ι
k
)2
k, where
b > 0 is adjustment cost parameter.
To capture the effect of business regulations on firms’ profits in a reduced form, we assume that
these regulations affect the revenues and the costs of the firms so that the profits of firm j net of
investment costs are
pij = (1− τx) pxjxj − pmmj − (1 + τι) pιιj − (1 + τb) pι
b
2
(
ιj
kj
)2
kj , (3)
where pxj , pm, and pι are the prices of xj , m, ι and k. In turn, τx, τι, and τb are the effects of
regulations. For example, τx > 0 can represent business taxes, and τι < 0 and τb < 0 can represent
regulations which subsidize investments or increase their efficiency (returns on investments).
We denote the effective interest rate by (1 + τr) r, where r is the interest rate and τr is the
regulation affecting it. This regulation can represent policies which facilitate lending and reduce
borrowing costs.
1This statement is essentially an analogue of the Rybczynski theorem.
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Suppose that firms in this industry are price setters so that they could coup their investments
in ICT. Moreover, A grows at a constant rate gA. The problem of the firm j then is
Vj = max
pxj ,lj ,ιj
{∫ +∞
0
pij (t) e
−[(1+τr)r−gA]tdt
}
s.t.
(1) , (2) , (3) ,
where the initial value of A is normalized to 1.
Using q to denote the shadow value of investments and focusing on symmetric equilibrium, the
necessary conditions for optimality are given by
pm = (1− α) (1− τx)
(
1−
1
e
)
x
m
, (4)
q = pι
[
(1 + τι) + (1 + τb) b
ι
k
]
, (5)
q˙ = q (1 + τr) r −
[
α (1− τx)
(
1−
1
e
)
x
k
+ (1 + τb) pι
b
2
( ι
k
)2
− qδ
]
, (6)
where e is the perceived elasticity of substitution, 1e is the Lerner index, and the price of goods x
is normalized to 1. We assume that the demand for goods x is given by a standard CES function
with an elasticity of substitution ε. In such a case, it can be shown that e = e (ε,N), and e (ε,N)
increases with ε and the number of firms N .
It can be shown that this system is saddle-path stable. In the steady-state we obtain
pιk
x
=
α (1− τx)
(
1− 1e
)
Γ1
, (7)
and
pιι
x
= (δ + gA)
pιk
x
, (8)
where Γ1 is given by
Γ1 = (1 + τι) [(1 + τr) r + δ] + (1 + τb) b (δ + gA)
[
(1 + τr) r +
1
2
(δ − gA)
]
.
To show the effect of the level of dependence α, we consider how the effects of changes in τx,
τι, τb, and τr on investments relative to output (value added) depend on α. It is straightforward
to show that the partial derivatives of pιιx with respect to τx, τι, τb, and τr are negative. In turn,
the following holds for any of these regulations
∂
∂α
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂τh
pιι
x
∣∣∣∣ = 1α
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂τh
pιι
x
∣∣∣∣ ,
where subscript h = x, ι, b, r. This implies that investments in industries which have higher depen-
dence (α) react more to changes in regulations than in industries which have lower dependence.
Regulations of entry costs could also affect the number of firms. If higher costs of entry reduce
the number of firms, then these costs would reduce e. In this case, the effect of such policies can
be summarized in terms of ∂∂(1/e)
pιι
x , which is negative according to (7) and (8). From (7) and (8)
it also follows that
∂
∂α
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂ (1/e)
pιι
x
∣∣∣∣ = 1α
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂ (1/e)
pιι
x
∣∣∣∣ ,
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which implies that the level of dependence can also matter for policies which affect costs of entry.
For a more rigorous analysis, which shows how entry costs can affect investment decisions for
different values of α, we endogenize the perceived elasticity of substitution/number of firms. We
suppose that all firms enter in the first period and entrants break even on a zero net-value condition,
V = T , where T represents entry costs. We assume that T is proportional to k, so that T = τ¯ pιk.
From the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, V˙ = [(1 + τr) r − gA]V − pi, it follows
that in the steady-state capital gains are zero, V˙ = 0. Therefore, the zero net-value condition is
equivalent to
(1− τx)x− pmm− (1 + τι) pιι− (1 + τb) pι
b
2
( ι
k
)2
k = [(1 + τr) r − gA] τ¯ pιk.
From this expression and (4), (8), it follows that
[
1− (1− α)
(
1−
1
e
)]
(1− τx)
x
pιk
= Γ2 + [(1 + τr) r − gA] τ¯ ,
where we use Γ2 to denote
Γ2 = (1 + τι) (δ + gA) + (1 + τb)
b
2
(δ + gA)
2
.
Further, expressing
(
1− 1e
)
in terms of pιkx from (7) and using the expression above gives
pιι
x
=
(δ + gA) (1− τx)
[(1 + τr) r − gA] τ¯ +
1−α
α Γ1 + Γ2
.
It can be shown that increasing entry cost τ¯ reduces investments. In turn, the effect of higher
dependence is given by
∂
∂α
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂τ¯
pιι
x
∣∣∣∣ = 2 1α2Γ1
1
[(1 + τr) r − gA] τ¯ +
1−α
α Γ1 + Γ2
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂τ¯
pιι
x
∣∣∣∣ ,
which implies that investments react more to the entry cost for higher values of dependence on
ICT.
In case entry cost is proportional to the level of output/value added, we would have that
pιι
x
=
(δ + gA) {1− τx − [(1 + τr) r − gA] τ¯}
1−α
α Γ1 + Γ2
.2
In this case also it can be shown that higher entry cost reduces investments. Moreover, it can be
shown that
∂
∂α
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂τ¯
pιι
x
∣∣∣∣ = 11−α
α Γ1 + Γ2
1
α2
Γ1
∣∣∣∣ ∂∂τ¯
pιι
x
∣∣∣∣ ,
which implies, again, that investments react more to the regulation of entry τ¯ for higher values of
dependence on ICT.3
In our empirical specification we look exactly for such a disparity across industries for regu-
lations of business activities. Admittedly, however, our reduced form analysis of the likely effects
of regulations might not fully encompass the true effects, which might be economy wide and not
different across industries. In such a case, our empirical exercise, which we present in the next
section, can be also viewed as a test of whether industry-level differences exist.
2Clearly, we need to assume that 1− τx − [(1 + τr) r − gA] τ¯ > 0 in order to have positive investments.
3In case when entry cost is proportional to m similar inference holds for certain parameter values.
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3 Empirical Methodology and Data
Our empirical specification tests whether ex ante differences in country-level regulations of busi-
ness activities, ex post, affect differently ICT investment in industries which depend more on ICT
compared to industries which depend less. Such a test has several advantages. It permits country
and industry fixed effects, which can be important for capturing, for example, demand and market
characteristics, as well as fixed costs of entry into industries. It does not depend on a particular
country-level model of investments in ICT capital. Therefore, we can avoid using country-level
variables. Moreover, in this respect, it does not depend on country-level drivers behind the imple-
mentation of regulations, which alleviates the concerns of endogeneity of the regulations.
The dependent variable in this empirical exercise is the level of investment in ICT capital
relative to value added in industry i and country c in our sample. After controlling for industry
and country fixed effects, we should find that the coefficient on the interaction between initial level
of regulation implementation and industries’ dependence on ICT capital is different from zero for
regulations which affect investment decisions.
Our empirical specification is then
Investmenti,c = β1 (Industry i’s Dependence× Regulation in Country c) (9)
+β2,i + β3,c + γXi,c + ηi,c,
where our focus is on the coefficient of the interaction term β1. The coefficients β2 and β3 are the
industry and country fixed effects, and ηi,c is the error term. In line with the theoretical model, Xi,c
includes the interest rate (industry rate of return on capital), and a measure of expected growth
of TFP. We also include in Xi,c the initial level of ICT capital relative to value added, which can
capture potential scale effects and path dependence. If a regulation has a positive (negative) effect
on investments in ICT then we should find that the estimate of β1 is positive (negative).
Our empirical specification does not include time dimension. Many studies of investments use
time dimension and often base their inference on within-industry variation (Alesina et al, 2005).
Given our research question, however, in terms of the methodology we follow another branch in
the literature, which uses within-country and between-industry variation to assess investments
and growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Carlin and Mayer, 2003). In this sense our study can
be thought to be complementary. Moreover, it helps us to focus on within-country and between-
industry variation because of two reasons. First, we have very limited number of time observations.
Second, our country-level business regulation variables have large variation across countries and
industry-level dependence variables have large variation across industries. However, these variables
tend to vary little over time. We describe our measures and data in detail in the next section.
3.1 Data and Measures
We obtain the data for country-level regulations of business activities from the World Bank’s Doing
Business database. In turn, our source of industry-level data is the EU KLEMS database (March
2011 update of 2009 release). It provides us with data for 30 ISIC industries (ISIC rev. 3), which
have aggregation level at 1- and 2-digits.4
4To our knowledge, this is the only database which contains sufficiently detailed industry-level data.
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We exclude the industries that are expected to have a large state involvement (public adminis-
tration and defence, and compulsory social security; education), since investment decisions in these
industries are likely to be not well explained in the frames of our theoretical model. With similar
reasoning, we exclude the telecommunications industry, which uses and produces ICT goods. This
limits our sample to 27 industries. Moreover, the use of the EU KLEMS database limits our sample
to 14 OECD countries.
Admittedly, the use of data from a rather homogenous set of countries involves trade-offs. It
can eliminate the influence of various unobservable factors on our results, for example. However,
at the same time it can weaken the results from cross-country comparisons.
In this study, we focus on the period 2005–2007. We do so because most of the regulation
indicators in the World Bank’s Doing Business database are available from 2005 and EU KLEMS
data end in 2007. Moreover, 2007 seems to be a convenient cut-off point since it allows us to avoid
incorporating data from the recent financial crisis.5
3.1.1 Dependence on ICT
In a country, a naive measure of an industry’s dependence on information and communication
technologies (hereafter, ICT dependence) would be its share of compensation of ICT capital out
of nominal value added. The problems with this measure can be seen from our model assuming
that firms hire ICT capital as they do other inputs. This measure reflects both the supply and
the demand of ICT, and distortions thereof, when we need only the demand in order to identify
technological differences. To alleviate this problem, we identify ICT dependence from US data,
where most likely distortions are the lowest and supply might be treated as perfectly elastic. This
identification strategy is widely used in the literature (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Barone and
Cingano, 2011).
Clearly, using US data we assume that the rank ordering of the share of compensation of ICT in
US industries corresponds to the rank ordering of the technological dependence of the industries.
We also assume that that rank ordering carries over to the rest of the countries in our sample.
An observation supporting the latter assumption is that the share of compensation of ICT capital
is constant in a steady state equilibrium. Therefore, much of the variation within industries may
arise from transitory shocks that would change the relative demand for ICT capital. As long as,
however, these shocks are common in OECD countries and there is technological and regulatory
convergence across these countries, the measure constructed from US data would be a good proxy.
Our (industry-level) data for ICT capital compensation and value added have a time span of
2005–2007. We take the ratio of these two and average the ratio over the period 2005–2007. We
use this average as a measure for ICT dependence.6
3.1.2 Investments in ICT and Remaining Industry-level Variables
We follow the theoretical model and construct the industry-level measure of ICT investment as the
ratio of nominal investments in ICT and value added averaged over 2005–2007 period. Further, for
5The consumption of communication services tends to exhibit strong differences between the period before financial
crisis and the period of financial crisis.
6We perform a simple ANOVA exercise for the share of ICT capital compensation in US industries for an extended
period of 2000–2007. This exercise suggests that industry-level variation accounts for 96.5 percent of the total
variation.
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an industry, we use the average growth of TFP during this period to proxy for the expected TFP
growth.
To measure interest rate, we use data for industry rate of return on capital. We also obtain
data for real ICT capital stock and use in our analysis the ratio of this stock and real value added
in an industry (both are in 1995 prices). The rate of return on capital and this ratio are from 2005
and are predetermined from the perspective of our analysis. Table 1 summarizes these variables.
In order to carry out separate analysis for investments in information technologies, commu-
nication technologies, and software, we compute variables in exact analogy to the variables for
aggregate ICT. We use labels IT, CT, and Software, to differentiate them. Table 2 offers summary
statistics of all industry-level variables.
3.1.3 Doing Business Indicators
We use five broad categories of regulation of business activities: regulations of starting business,
property registration, getting credit, protecting investors, and paying taxes. The data for these
regulations are from the World Bank’s Doing Business database. These data are based on studies
of legal system and regulations, and surveys of lawyers. The variables which we use, together with
their descriptions, are presented in Table 3.
These variables are better proxies for regulation of business activities than other usually avail-
able perceptions-based measures (Djankov et al, 2006). In this regard, using a sample of OECD
countries, arguably, allows us to limit the possibility of disconnect between existence and imple-
mentation of regulations.
We use observations of these variables from 2005, where available. Variables related to regulation
of investor protection and paying taxes are available from 2006. We use values from 2006 for them.7
The use of values from 2006 may exacerbate reverse causality concerns. However, since these
variables display little variation over short periods of time, most likely this is not a significant
issue.8 Table 4 offers summary statistics of these variables.9
4 Results
The first column of Table 5 offers our main results (βˆ1) from estimation of the specification (9).
The dependent variable is ICT investment, and the interaction terms consist of the measure of
dependence on ICT and regulatory variables. Given that the dependent variable is from the interval
[0, 1], we use censored Tobit estimation method, with robust (clustered) standard errors. Moreover,
in all regressions we exclude the top and the bottom percentiles of the dependent variable as
outliers.
The results suggest that investments in ICT are lower in industries that depend more on ICT
in countries with a greater number of procedures, time, and monetary cost required for starting
a business, and procedures and time required for registering property. Moreover, investments in
ICT are lower in countries with a greater number of tax payments and time required to pay taxes.
Investments are higher, however, in countries with legal rights systems which facilitate lending. For
7Variables related to starting business are available from 2004.
8A simple ANOVA exercise performed on these variables suggests that country-level variation explains 82.8–99.0
percent of the total variation. In turn, time variation explains only 0–2.9 percent.
9Online Appendix – Data offers the correlations among country- and industry-level variables and additional basic
statistics.
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the remaining regulatory variables, although the coefficients on interaction term are not statistically
significant, they tend to have plausible signs. All in all, this evidence suggests that the costs of
starting business, registering property, and paying taxes reduce ICT investment and better legal
rights systems increase it.
Since we have a difference-in-differences estimator, one way to compute the magnitude of our
results is as follows. We take the countries that rank the lowest and the top in terms of the regulatory
variables and compute the difference between the levels of these variables for them. Further, we
take the industries that rank the lowest and the highest in terms of the level of dependence on ICT
and compute the difference between dependence levels. In our sample, these industries are Real
Estate Activities (lowest dependence) and Financial Intermediation (highest dependence). Finally,
we compute
βˆ1 ×∆ICT Dependence×∆Regulation,
where ∆ stands for the difference operator between the lowest and the highest levels. The last
column of Table 5 reports these effects for each regression. Focusing on statistically significant
estimates of β1, the computed effects are in-between 0.016–0.028. These numbers correspond to
the effect of moving from the top country to the bottom in terms of the doing business regulations
on ICT investment (relative to value added) in highest dependence industry relative to the lowest
dependence industry. All these numbers suggest that regulations of doing business have economi-
cally large and significant effects at least relative to the mean of ICT investment which is 0.023.
Admittedly, these are the largest effects of regulations according to our estimations.10
4.1 Results for the Components of ICT
There is evidence showing that the investments in the components of ICT, information technologies,
communication technologies, and software, have varying effects on aggregate performance (Jorgen-
son and Stiroh, 2000). In the light of this evidence, we test whether regulations of doing business
have different effects on investments in information technologies, communication technologies, and
software.
Tables 6–8 report our results from the estimations of the specification (9), where the dependent
variables are investments in information technologies (IT), communication technologies (CT), and
software, relative to value added. The interaction terms consist of business regulation variables
and measures of dependence on IT, CT, and software. Similarly to ICT dependence, we use the
shares of compensation of computing equipment, communications equipment, and software capital
in nominal value added in US industries to measure dependence levels. Estimation method is Tobit
with [0, 1] censoring and robust (clustered) standard errors.
The results for investments in information technologies, communication technologies, and soft-
ware, are quite similar to our results for aggregate ICT, with a few notable exceptions. Lower
monetary costs for registering property significantly increase investments in information technolo-
gies and software. Investments in software also increase with the ability of shareholders to sue
the directors and officers for misconduct. In turn, the greater liability of directors for self-dealing
reduces investments in communication technologies. However, we fail to establish any systematic
evidence that the number of tax payments and the time required to compile taxes affect invest-
10In an attempt of ruling out other explanations for our results, we perform various robustness checks and offer the
results in Online Appendix – Robustness Checks.
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ments in communication technologies. Higher tax rate reduces investments in software but does
not affect investments in IT and CT.
A potential explanation why director liability can reduce investments in communication tech-
nologies can be that investments in these technologies, in industries that depend more on them, are
relatively large scale projects and might require risk taking. Therefore, higher liability might scare
investments. We neither have data nor intend to test these conjectures in this paper. Admittedly,
further research in this direction might be valuable.
5 Conclusions
Investments in ICT significantly contribute to economic growth and development according to
recent empirical evidence. In this paper, we investigate how the regulations of business activities
affect investments in ICT. All in all, our results suggest that these regulations have significant
and economically sizable effects. We find that reducing the number of procedures, time, and costs
required for starting business and time and procedures required for registering property increases
investments in ICT. We also find that reducing the number of tax payments, time required for
compiling tax payments, and strengthening legal rights, increases investments in ICT. Moreover,
according to our results, lower monetary costs of registering private property imply higher invest-
ments in information technologies, and greater ability of shareholders to sue the directors and
officers for misconduct imply higher investments in software. In turn, lesser extent of director lia-
bility implies higher investments in communication technologies, and lower tax rate implies higher
investments in software.
Recently, many developed and developing countries have instituted policy agendas which aim to
increase investments in ICT (e.g., Digital Agenda in Europe, National Digital Economy Strategy in
Australia, and eReadiness Initiatives in Pakistan). Our results suggest possible policy instruments
which can motivate investments in ICT and its components and complement such policy agendas.
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Tables
Table 1: Description of Industry-level Variables
Variable Name Description
ICT Investment Nominal investment in ICT divided to nominal value added and averaged over the
period 2005–2007. Both variables are in national currency units (in EUR in the
Czech Republic).
ICT Dependence ICT capital compensation in US industries divided to nominal value added and
averaged over the period 2005–2007. Both variables are in national currency units
(in EUR in the Czech Republic).
KICT Real ICT capital stock divided to real value added in 2005. Both variables are in
1995 prices.
r Industry rate of return on capital in 2005.
gA The contribution of TFP to value added growth averaged over the period 2005–2007.
Sample Industries (1- and 2-digit ISIC rev. 3; EU KLEMS): AtB, C, E, F, H, J, N, O, 15t16, 17t19, 20, 21t22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27t28, 29, 30t33, 34t35, 36t37, 50, 51, 52, 60t63, 70, and 71t74.
Table 2: Summary Statistics – Industry-level Variables
N Mean SD Min Max
ICT Investment 364 0.023 0.018 0.001 0.138
ICT Dependence 27 0.047 0.028 0.005 0.099
KICT 364 0.259 1.057 0.002 20.090
IT Investment 364 0.007 0.006 0.000 0.050
IT Dependence 27 0.010 0.008 0.001 0.042
KIT 364 0.130 0.179 0.000 2.314
CT Investment 364 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.044
CT Dependence 27 0.008 0.012 0.002 0.062
KCT 364 0.080 0.838 0.000 15.995
Software Investment 364 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.109
Software Dependence 27 0.029 0.019 0.002 0.076
KSoftware 364 0.044 0.098 0.000 1.781
r 378 0.140 0.156 -0.650 1.195
gA 378 0.012 0.062 -0.467 0.445
Note: This table shows the descriptive statistics of industry-level variables. The data are from the EU KLEMS database.
See Table 1 and the main text for the descriptions of variables. The definitions of variables related to IT, CT, and Software
are identical to the definitions of variables related to ICT.
Table 3: Description of the Variables from the Doing Business Database
Variable Name Description
Regulations of Starting Business
Entry Procedures Number of procedures that are officially required for starting a business (out of
100).
Entry Time Number of months (31 calendar days) necessary to complete all procedures that are
officially required for starting a business.
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Table 3 – (Continued)
Variable Name Description
Entry Cost Monetary costs of completing all procedures that are officially required for starting
a business (percentage of per capita income).
Minimum Capital Measures the amount that entrepreneurs need to deposit in a bank (or with a notary)
before registration and up to 3 months following incorporation (percentage of per
capita income).
Regulations of Property Registration
Property Procedures Number of procedures that are legally required for registering property transfers
(out of 100).
Property Time Number of months (31 calendar days) necessary for completing all procedures that
are legally required for registering property transfers.
Property Cost Monetary costs of completing all procedures that are legally required for registering
property (percentage of the property value).
Regulations of Getting Credit
Legal Rights Measures whether laws of collateral and bankruptcy provide for features that facil-
itate lending (0 to 1 index).
Credit Info Measures rules affecting the access and quality of credit information available
through public and/or private credit registries (0 to 1 index).
Regulations of Investor Protection
Business Disclosure Measures whether laws provide for ways of enhancing transparency of related-party
transactions (0 to 1 index).
Director Liability Measures the extent director liability for self-dealing (0 to 1 index).
Ease of Suits Measures the ability of shareholders to sue directors and officers for misconduct (0
to 1 index).
Tax System
Tax Number Measures the total number of taxes and contributions paid (out of 100).
Tax Time Number of months (31 calendar days) taken to compile and pay 3 major types of
taxes and contributions: the corporate income tax, value added/sales tax, and labor
taxes.
Tax Rate Measures the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions borne by the business
(percentage of commercial profit).
Sample Countries: Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics – Country-level Variables
Mean SD Min Max
Entry Procedures 0.071 0.028 0.030 0.110
Entry Time 0.912 0.962 0.097 3.677
Entry Cost 0.074 0.070 0.000 0.214
Minimum Capital 0.329 0.258 0.000 0.749
Property Procedures 0.046 0.013 0.020 0.060
Property Time 1.810 3.252 0.177 12.613
Property Cost 0.039 0.021 0.005 0.087
Legal Rights 0.700 0.184 0.300 1
Credit Info 0.833 0.173 0.500 1
Business Disclosure 0.550 0.238 0.200 1
Director Liability 0.529 0.182 0.200 0.900
Ease of Suits 0.679 0.137 0.400 0.900
Tax Number 0.139 0.064 0.040 0.270
Tax Time 8.806 6.672 3.387 30
Tax Rate 0.502 0.111 0.333 0.768
Note: This table shows the descriptive statistics of county-level variables. The number of country-level observations is 14,
and the data are from the Word Bank’s Doing Business database. Variables related to investor protection and paying taxes
are from 2006. The remaining variables are from 2005. See Table 3 and the main text for the descriptions of variables.
Table 5: Regression Results for ICT Investment
Regulation
ICT Dependence×
KICT r gA
Max.
Regulation Effect
Entry Procedures -3.117*** (1.089) 0.001 (0.001) -0.012** (0.005) -0.029** (0.014) -0.024
Entry Time -0.064** (0.031) 0.001 (0.001) -0.011** (0.006) -0.031** (0.015) -0.022
Entry Cost -1.319*** (0.409) 0.001 (0.001) -0.013** (0.005) -0.031** (0.015) -0.027
Minimum Capital -0.011 (0.100) 0.001 (0.001) -0.011** (0.006) -0.032** (0.016) -0.001
Property Procedures -4.545* (2.603) 0.001 (0.001) -0.012** (0.005) -0.032** (0.015) -0.017
Property Time -0.019*** (0.005) 0.001* (0.001) -0.011* (0.006) -0.032** (0.015) -0.022
Property Cost -2.257 (1.564) 0.001 (0.001) -0.012** (0.006) -0.031** (0.016) -0.017
Legal Rights 0.240* (0.135) 0.001 (0.001) -0.011** (0.006) -0.032** (0.016) 0.016
Credit Info -0.072 (0.175) 0.001 (0.001) -0.012** (0.006) -0.032** (0.016) -0.003
Business Disclosure -0.014 (0.127) 0.001 (0.001) -0.011* (0.006) -0.032** (0.016) -0.001
Director Liability 0.093 (0.168) 0.001 (0.001) -0.011** (0.006) -0.033** (0.016) 0.006
Ease of Suits 0.253 (0.203) 0.001 (0.001) -0.012** (0.006) -0.031** (0.016) 0.012
Tax Number -1.304*** (0.391) 0.001 (0.001) -0.010* (0.006) -0.032** (0.016) -0.028
Tax Time -0.007*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) -0.011** (0.006) -0.032** (0.015) -0.019
Tax Rate -0.399 (0.246) 0.001 (0.001) -0.012** (0.006) -0.033** (0.016) -0.016
Note: This table reports the results from estimation of the specification (9), where the dependent variable is ICT Investment.
The last column reports the maximum effects of regulations. The estimation method is Tobit with [0, 1] censoring. All
regressions include industry and country dummies. The number of observations is 364, and F-statistics vary from 13.18 to
16.54. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level.
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Table 6: Regression Results for IT Investment
Regulation
IT Dependence×
KIT r gA
Max.
Regulation Effect
Entry Procedures -3.298*** (0.839) 0.013** (0.006) -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.010) -0.011
Entry Time -0.065** (0.026) 0.013** (0.006) -0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.010) -0.009
Entry Cost -1.770*** (0.447) 0.013** (0.006) -0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.010) -0.015
Minimum Capital -0.057 (0.111) 0.013** (0.006) -0.002 (0.001) -0.001 (0.010) -0.002
Property Procedures -4.249* (2.321) 0.013** (0.006) -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.010) -0.007
Property Time -0.032** (0.014) 0.013** (0.006) -0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.010) -0.016
Property Cost -2.690** (1.160) 0.013** (0.006) -0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.011) -0.009
Legal Rights 0.378** (0.180) 0.013** (0.006) -0.002 (0.001) -0.000 (0.010) 0.011
Credit Info -0.127 (0.186) 0.013** (0.006) -0.002 (0.001) -0.001 (0.011) -0.003
Business Disclosure 0.041 (0.162) 0.013** (0.006) -0.002 (0.001) -0.000 (0.010) 0.001
Director Liability -0.164 (0.157) 0.013** (0.006) -0.002 (0.001) -0.000 (0.010) -0.005
Ease of Suits 0.258 (0.164) 0.013** (0.006) -0.002* (0.001) -0.000 (0.011) 0.005
Tax Number -1.735*** (0.624) 0.013** (0.006) -0.002 (0.001) -0.000 (0.010) -0.016
Tax Time -0.013** (0.005) 0.013** (0.006) -0.002 (0.001) -0.000 (0.010) -0.014
Tax Rate -0.368 (0.259) 0.013** (0.006) -0.002* (0.001) -0.001 (0.011) -0.007
Note: This table reports the results from estimation of the specification (9), where the dependent variable is IT Investment.
The last column reports the maximum effects of regulations. The estimation method is Tobit with [0, 1] censoring. All
regressions include industry and country dummies. The number of observations is 364, and F-statistics vary from 18.79 to
21.83. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level.
Table 7: Regression Results for CT Investment
Regulation
CT Dependence×
KCT r gA
Max.
Regulation Effect
Entry Procedures -1.972** (1.004) 0.000* (0.000) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) -0.010
Entry Time -0.081*** (0.031) 0.000* (0.000) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) -0.018
Entry Cost -0.913** (0.426) 0.000* (0.000) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) -0.012
Minimum Capital -0.065 (0.080) 0.000** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) -0.003
Property Procedures -2.587 (2.944) 0.000* (0.000) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) -0.006
Property Time -0.010** (0.004) 0.000* (0.000) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) -0.007
Property Cost 0.035 (1.591) 0.000** (0.000) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) 0.000
Legal Rights 0.282* (0.161) 0.000* (0.000) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) 0.012
Credit Info -0.025 (0.132) 0.000** (0.000) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) -0.001
Business Disclosure 0.091 (0.090) 0.000** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) 0.004
Director Liability -0.276** (0.118) 0.000* (0.000) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) -0.012
Ease of Suits 0.069 (0.181) 0.000** (0.000) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) 0.002
Tax Number 0.475 (0.439) 0.000** (0.000) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.007** (0.003) 0.007
Tax Time -0.001 (0.002) 0.000** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) -0.002
Tax Rate 0.137 (0.243) 0.000** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) 0.004
Note: This table reports the results from estimation of the specification (9), where the dependent variable is CT Investment.
The last column reports the maximum effects of regulations. The estimation method is Tobit with [0, 1] censoring. All
regressions include industry and country dummies. The number of observations is 364, and F-statistics vary from 6.53 to
7.72. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level.
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Table 8: Regression Results for Software Investment
Regulation
Software Dependence×
KSoftware r gA
Max.
Regulation Effect
Entry Procedures -3.347*** (1.216) 0.007 (0.018) -0.006 (0.004) 0.024 (0.028) -0.020
Entry Time -0.088*** (0.020) 0.007 (0.017) -0.005 (0.004) 0.024 (0.030) -0.023
Entry Cost -1.337*** (0.368) 0.007 (0.017) -0.006 (0.004) 0.023 (0.029) -0.021
Minimum Capital -0.061 (0.081) 0.006 (0.018) -0.004 (0.004) 0.025 (0.030) -0.003
Property Procedures -4.429 (2.722) 0.008 (0.018) -0.005 (0.004) 0.023 (0.028) -0.013
Property Time -0.012* (0.006) 0.009 (0.018) -0.005 (0.004) 0.025 (0.030) -0.012
Property Cost -4.658*** (1.197) 0.003 (0.017) -0.006 (0.004) 0.025 (0.029) -0.028
Legal Rights 0.142 (0.108) 0.007 (0.018) -0.005 (0.004) 0.025 (0.031) 0.007
Credit Info -0.141 (0.175) 0.005 (0.018) -0.005 (0.004) 0.025 (0.030) -0.005
Business Disclosure -0.051 (0.126) 0.006 (0.018) -0.005 (0.005) 0.025 (0.030) -0.003
Director Liability 0.136 (0.149) 0.005 (0.018) -0.005 (0.004) 0.025 (0.031) 0.007
Ease of Suits 0.522*** (0.150) 0.004 (0.018) -0.005 (0.004) 0.026 (0.030) 0.019
Tax Number -1.202*** (0.429) 0.008 (0.018) -0.004 (0.004) 0.023 (0.029) -0.021
Tax Time -0.005* (0.003) 0.006 (0.018) -0.005 (0.004) 0.024 (0.030) -0.011
Tax Rate -0.395** (0.167) 0.005 (0.018) -0.006 (0.004) 0.025 (0.031) -0.013
Note: This table reports the results from estimation of the specification (9), where the dependent variable is Software
Investment. The last column reports the maximum effects of regulations. The estimation method is Tobit with [0, 1]
censoring. All regressions include industry and country dummies. The number of observations is 364, and F-statistics vary
from 11.59 to 14.18. Robust (clustered) standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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